NSW Farmers' submission to the Freight Policy Reform Interim Directions

October 2024

NSW Farmers' Association

[redacted]

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About NSW Farmers

NSW Farmers is Australia's largest state farming organisation, representing the interests of its farmer members in the state. We are Australia's only state-based farming organisation that represents farmers across all agricultural commodities. We also speak up on issues that matter to farmers, whether it's the environment, biosecurity, water, animal welfare, economics, trade, workforce or rural and regional affairs.

Agriculture is an economic 'engine' industry in New South Wales. Despite having faced extreme weather conditions, pandemic and natural disasters in the past three years, farmers across the state produced more than $23 billion in 2021-22, or around 25 per cent of total national production, and contribute significantly to the state's total exports. Agriculture is the heartbeat of regional communities, directly employing almost two per cent of the state's workers and supporting roles in processing, manufacturing, retail, and hospitality across regional and metropolitan areas. The sector hopes to grow this contribution even further by working toward the target of $30 billion in economic output by 2030.

Our state's diverse geography and climatic conditions mean a wide variety of crops and livestock can be cultivated here. We represent the interests of farmers from a broad range of commodities – from avocados and tomatoes, apples, bananas and berries, through grains, pulses and lentils to oysters, cattle, dairy, goats, sheep, pigs and chickens.

We have teams working across regional New South Wales and in Sydney to ensure key policies and messages travel from paddock to Parliament. Our regional branch network ensures local voices guide and shape our positions on issues affecting real people in real communities. Our Branch members bring policy ideas to Annual Conference, our Advisory Committees provide specialist, practical advice to decision makers on issues affecting the sector, and our 60-member Executive Council makes the final decision on the policies we advocate on.

As well as advocating for farmers on issues that shape agriculture and regional areas, we provide direct business support and advice to our members. Our workplace relations team has a history of providing tailored, affordable business advice that can save our members thousands of dollars. Meanwhile, we maintain partnerships and alliances with like-minded organisations, universities, government agencies and commercial businesses across Australia. We are also a proud founding member of the National Farmers' Federation.

Executive summary

NSW Farmers welcomes the opportunity to respond to the Transport for NSW Freight Policy Reform Interim Directions Report. In particular, this submission responds to the direction to *"work with the grain industry stakeholders, including growers, silo operators, and network managers, to determine the optimal end-to-end network, including rail lines, that should make up the grain network for long term investment"* with a view towards closing 'non-operational' lines whose maintenance costs *"cannot be justified... with savings directed towards local roads that feed larger more effective silos on the main rail lines"*.

In addition, the submission makes several observations regarding regional issues and opportunities that have not been adequately captured in the Interim Directions Report, including the movement of containerised freight, bottlenecks over the Blue Mountains, the utilisation of ports other than Port Botany, and the transport of value-added agricultural produce.

Recommendation 1:
That adequate consideration of the issues and opportunities facing regional freight transport be given in the final Freight Policy Directions Report, including:

- The growing volume and value of agricultural product moved by freight in NSW.
- The coordination of containerised exports and imports throughout regional NSW, not just Western Sydney.
- Congestions issues on rail and road, especially with respect to freight moving over the Blue Mountains.
- The investment needed to support future bulk and containerised freight through ports other than Port Botany.
- The importance of supporting a value-adding supply chain for agricultural produce, both for domestic consumption and exports.

Recommendation 2:
That no Direction to close rail lines in NSW that support the movement of grain and other products be incorporated into the final Freight Policy Directions Report.

The NSW Farmers Association (NSWFA) is opposed to the closure of any rail lines relied on for the movement of grain for four key reasons:

1. The Directions Report drastically overstates the maintenance costs that can be saved, with nearly all of the 3,139 km of 'non-operational' line with 'unjustifiable' maintenance costs already completely defunct or non-existent.
2. The Directions Report fails to identify the opportunities and potential maintenance cost savings that could be gained by increasing the capacity and quality of the regional grain freight network, noting that the low usage of some lines is a result of the inability to use modern high-capacity locomotives (constrained by low axel loads), not a result of apparent low demand from farmers and grain handlers.
3. A lack of an identified mechanism through which hypothetical savings can be allocated to the regional freight network, noting the political realities of funding decisions, and that many rail lines are already underfunded with no apparent benefit to the wider network.
4. The non-market costs associated with moving freight from rail to road are substantial and outweigh any potential savings. Non-market costs include:
    a. Carbon dioxide emissions
    b. Road damage costs
    c. Congestion costs
    d. Fatalities and injuries
    e. Decreased resilience to weather-related events

f. Exacerbated labour shortages for truck drivers

As a hypothetical example, this submission models the non-market costs associated with moving an additional 2MMT (million metric tonnes) of grain per year on roads and finds that $4.01m/year (Present value: $65.74m, 5% discount rate) in costs would be incurred as a result of this reconfiguration of the grain freight supply chain. For a specific hypothetical example of the decommissioning of The Rock to Boree Creek line, the analysis finds that for 2023-24, the combined market and non-market costs outweigh the potential maintenance savings made by closing the line.

The submission demonstrates that even for grain lines with some of the highest maintenance cost per tonne of grain moved, the total market and non-market costs associated with moving grain on roads can exceed any of the potential savings made. It is therefore disingenuous for the Directions Report to suppose that the maintenance costs for some of these lines "cannot be justified", without undertaking the even barest economic appraisal.

NSW agriculture has a goal of becoming a $30 billion sector by 2030, contributing to a national target of $100 billion. Resolving freight bottlenecks and infrastructure inefficiencies is a critical for the sector to achieve this goal, including access to both international and domestic markets.

Lack of Regional Focus in the Interim Directions

NSW Farmers welcomes some of the directions present in the interim report that have direct implications for the regional movement of freight, including those to enhance the amount and reliability of road maintenance funding for local councils, and supporting an east coast grain strategy. However, the overall emphasis on freight moving around Western Sydney and Port Botany ultimately detracts from the issues and opportunities present elsewhere in the freight network.

It is particularly disappointing to note that the Directions Report singles out the movement of containerised freight around Western Sydney without acknowledging the fact that containerised freight is a growing mode of transport in Regional NSW.



Figure 1: Total value of production from cropping enterprises in NSW. Source: ABARES Farm Data Portal.

In particular, the Interim Directions Report fails to adequately address several key issues, including:

- The growing value and volume of agricultural product utilising road and rail infrastructure. For example, While the Directions Report identifies that the volume of on-farm storage is growing, it fails to account for the fact that the amount of grain being produced in NSW is increasing year-on-year (see Figure 1).
- Bottlenecks associated with the movement of both trucks and rail freight across the Blue Mountains into and through Sydney. Noting that congestion with passenger rail continues to be a serious growing issue.
- The opportunities to move greater volumes of bulk grain and containerised freight through both the Port of Newcastle and Port Kembla, and the upgrades of the entire freight network required to facilitate this. While the Directions Paper identifies that future investments into alternative Ports are matters for infrastructure owners, Government must also acknowledge its role in providing the public infrastructure necessary to enable private capital – including into upcountry silos and receival sites – to be developed.
- A blind spot for agricultural value-added produce. While the Directions Report identifies that the majority of wheat produced in NSW is typically not directly exported, instead going to various local mills for processing, it fails to recognise that NSW exports typically between $17-27 million of meal and flour per year. As a value-adding process that enables agricultural produce to reach its highest value in domestic and world markets, the freight network must adequately support both the movement to food product manufacturing sites, and then to

ports. Other agricultural products that are typically processed in some way before consumption or export, including cotton, rice, fruits and vegetables, and meat, require adequate standing in a reformed Freight Policy.

For example, the business cases put forward by RDA Orana for upgrades to the Golden Highway and the upgrade/connection of the Maryvale-Gulgong-Sandy Hollow rail line both demonstrate strong economic credentials (benefit-cost ratios of 2.30 and 1.86 respectively). The business cases address critical issues facing agricultural and regional freight, as well as take advantages of the existing opportunities associated with the Port of Newcastle. Rather than focusing on where money can be cut from the regional freight network, the Freight Policy Reform should lay the groundwork for additional funding.

Recommendation 1:
That adequate consideration of the issues and opportunities facing regional freight transport be given in the final Freight Policy Directions Report, including:

- The growing volume and value of agricultural product moved by freight in NSW.
- The coordination of containerised exports and imports throughout regional NSW, not just Western Sydney.
- Congestions issues on rail and road, especially with respect to freight moving over the Blue Mountains.
- The investment needed to support future bulk and containerised freight through ports other than Port Botany.
- The importance of supporting a value-adding supply chain for agricultural produce, both for domestic consumption and exports.

Optimisation of the grain rail network

The Freight Policy Reform Interim Directions Paper indicates that the maintenance costs for approximately 3,139 km of rail in NSW cannot be justified, and calls for a process to reallocate funds saved to local roads. However, the Directions Paper fails to identify what it considers 'non-operational', causing considerable confusion regarding the possible savings that could possibly be achieved. Indeed, if all 3,139kms of non-operational line were currently being maintained, then some $80 billion/year could potentially be reallocated to other uses[1]. However, as shown in Appendix 1, only a tiny fraction of these lines are maintained at all, with the overwhelming majority either defunct or completely lost to time. Some, like the Casino Murwillumbah line, have been completely converted into other uses such as rail trails[2].

Clearly, no maintenance savings can be found from lines that are not being maintained at all, and before the Directions Paper can be finalised it must clarify exactly what lines it expects savings can be found before it recommends a process to optimise them. At best, the reference to the 3,139km of non-operational line as an unjustifiable expense demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the Country Rail Network, and at worst it is deliberately misleading and calibrated to achieve a political outcome.

Notwithstanding the fatal contradictions noted above - NSW Farmers rejects calls to close operational and maintained grain rail lines in NSW on the basis that they are not used in some years. The characterisation of 'bumper crop' years in the Interim Directions Paper as abnormal, and not part of the business-as-usual freight task ignores the fact that farmers rely on high production years to make up for drier periods, and provide the critical income injections into their businesses to maintain their capital and remain sustainable. Any reduction in the level of service provided by the rail network in those critical high-production years directly threatens the long-term viability of grain farmers.

In addition, NSWFA raises the following concerns regarding the direction to close certain rail lines:

- The directions ignore the opportunity costs associated with not upgrading existing infrastructure to 25TAL and facilitating more use of the infrastructure that would justify its maintenance cost
- The directions ignore the reality of transport funding decision-making, with no mechanism to ensure that any potential savings are ring-fenced and reinvested into other parts of the freight network
- Closing rail lines does not only impact rail infrastructure, but will also strand other associated capital, including silos along that line
- A greater reliance on trucks will
    - diminish the agriculture industry's ability to decarbonise and reach Net Zero
    - increase the congestion and maintenance cost of already underfunded local regional roads
    - decrease resilience of the freight network by increasing the reliance on unsealed roads which become untraversable in wet weather
    - exacerbate existing labour shortages for truck drivers

The following sections deal with the issues raised above in greater detail.

Recommendation 2:
That no Direction to close rail lines in NSW that support the movement of grain and other products be incorporated into the final Freight Policy Directions Report.

[1] Transport for NSW 2024, Economic Parameter Values, Table 15.3 version 2024.4.
Low range of Blow-Line Rail Maintenance Costs is $25,805/track km/year
[2] VisitNSW, Norther Rivers Rail Trail https://www.visitnsw.com/destinations/north-coast/the-tweed-area/murwillumbah/attractions/northern-rivers-rail-trail

Opportunity cost of not upgrading rail

NSW Farmers is concerned that the Interim Directions Paper does not recognise that both the supply and demand of above-rail services is constrained by the variable capacity of the Country Rail Network. As shown in Figure 1, only 470kms of the Country Rail Network are built to 25TAL and can therefore handle all modern locomotives. The vast majority of rail however is built to 21TAL or less, and can therefore only handle lighter, slower, and less energy efficient locomotives, that NSWFA understands are no longer in production. As older locomotives continue to be phased out as they reach the end of their useful lives, the decline in the use of the lines they are able to service becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy. Lines that see such a decline are more likely to be passed over for upgrades, which in turn drives the decline further.

However, if more lines were upgraded to 25TAL, and more above-rail services could be offered, NSWFA argues that demand would rise to meet the improved supply. The Interim Directions Report must therefore take a market-based view of the supply-demand dynamics of grail line use, including examining how improving rail capacity (TAL) facilitate an increase in rail use for grain.

Finally, it must be acknowledged that upgrading rail lines can actually result in reduced maintenance costs, especially following natural disasters. For example, timber sleepers have a shorter economic life, and can be severely damaged by floods. Concrete sleepers by contrast have a much longer lifespan, and are far more resilient against natural disasters.



Figure 2: Length of Country Rail Network by TAL. Source: Transport for NSW, Rail Capability Dashboard.

Lack of funding mechanism identified

While the direction to reallocate funds saved from the maintenance of rail lines towards other priority freight infrastructure such as roads is theoretically possible, it ignores the reality that transport infrastructure funding is never hypothecated from specific funding sources or efficiency gains. As explained by LEK: *"systematic long-term underfunding has left Australia's regional road network in very poor condition. Most road-related fees and charges are levied by the Australian, State and*

Territory governments, however, they are not hypothecated to road expenditure and are instead directed to consolidated funds."[3] The issue of trying to hypothecate funds are compounded when attempting to value a perceived maintenance saving, and then indexing saving over time on an ongoing basis.

Ultimately, funding decisions are made by the governments of the day, and are not bound by the hypothetical allocations or re-allocations made by previous governments. There is no reason to expect that a commitment made by one government to increase funding for local roads in one election cycle on the basis that some indeterminate amount of money was saved on the maintenance of rail will be honoured by the next government.

In addition, as outlined in NSWFA previous submission, NSW Government funding for Fixing Country Rail has declined to only $18m in 2024-25, down from $104m (Country Rail Capital Maintenance) in 2015-16. Therefore, it is considered that as government has already gradually de-funded maintenance for regional rail networks over the past 10 years, there are no actual further real savings to be made in decommissioning parts of the already neglected network.

Therefore, no closure of grain rail lines can be justified on the basis that additional funding for other transport infrastructure will replace them.

Non-market and externality costs of reliance on trucks

The Productivity Commission notes that the benefits of increasing the rail mode share are often 'non-market' in character, including reduced road congestion, lower carbon emissions, and fewer injuries and deaths. Therefore, government expenditure on rail is potentially justified through the public goods that it generates, even at a net monetary cost to taxpayers[4].

The following sections detail some of the non-market and externality factors that the Directions Report has failed to identify as relevant factors when making the observations that underutilised rail lines cannot be justified (presumably on financial grounds) or implying that increased funding for roads will be sufficient to mitigate against the additional costs of moving more freight on trucks.

The following sub-sections undertake an economic analysis of some of the non-market costs associated with moving more grain by trucks as opposed to rail. In summary, based on a hypothetical 2MMT/year of grain being transported by road instead of rail, some of the quantifiable non-market costs include:

- CO2-e emissions: $1.66m/year
- Increased road damage costs: $0.63m/year
- Congestion costs: $1.00m/year
- Fatalities and injuries: $0.78m/year
- **TOTAL: $4.01m/year**

In addition, there are other un-monetised non-market impacts, including to network resilience to weather-related events and the flow-on effects to the already constrained labour market for truck drivers.

[3] LEK 2023, Connecting the Dots: Improving Australian Grain Supply Chain Efficiency. Report prepared for Grain Growers Ltd, September 2023.
[4] Productivity Commission 2022, Lifting productivity at Australia's container ports: between water, wharf and warehouse Inquiry report: Overview, report no. 99, Canberra.

If, for example, The Rock to Boree Creek line[5] (57km, 19.5TAL) were decommissioned, then this would hypothetically result in saved maintenance costs of approximately $1.36m/year[6]. However, if the 264,000 tonnes of grain that used the line in 2023-24[7] were diverted to trucks, then this would result in $452,000/year in non-market costs alone. When accounting for the direct vehicle operating and travel time costs of approximately $947,000m/year[8] the supposed benefits in saved maintenance costs vanish entirely.

Carbon emissions

The Freight Policy Reform Interim Directions Report identifies Decarbonisation is a key pillar of reform in support of the NSW Towards Net Zero Emissions Freight Policy, which supports the overarching State objective to reach Net Zero by 2050. The Net Zero Policy identifies that 22% of total transport emissions comes from heavy-duty trucks, and that rail freight produces 16 times less GHG emissions and is four times more fuel efficient than road freight. Box 2 illustrates the potential magnitude of the CO2-e emissions damages that could arise from a closure of some grain rail branch lines.

It is critical that this policy should not be at odds with other transport related policy regarding reduced emissions, nor should the freight policy stand in the way of the industry's own decarbonisation by forcing greater reliance on truck-based freight movements.

Box 1: CO2-e damage cost modelling for hypothetical grain rail line closure scenario.

The TraNSIT Supply Chain Transport and Logistics model indicates that that cost of carbon emissions per 1,000 tonne kms of grain moved by road is $9.97, compared to $0.06 for rail[9]. If an average of 2 MMT/year of grain production in NSW (~10%) is forced to travel an additional hour to the nearest intermodal if the nearest rail grain receival site is closed (approximately 85km), then this would amount to average annual carbon emission damages of $1.66m/year, $26.86m in present value terms[10].

Increased damage to regional roads and congestion

Trucks inflict substantial damages to roads, amounting to 30.24c/vkt for B-double trucks[11]. Using the same volume and distance assumptions as outlined in Box 1, this amounts to an additional $0.63m/year in road damage costs, $10.18m in present value terms.

In addition, the congestion around intermodals can add considerable time to trips made for road-based freight transport. The value of travel time for freight-moving B-double trucks in regional NSW is approximately $40.18/hour[12]. An additional 25,000 B-double truck trips are required to move 2MMT of grain on the road network, which is expected to add considerable time to their own and other vehicles on the road. Assuming each of those trips generated an additional hour of freight-related travel-time[13], this would amount to $1.00m/year, $16.21m in present value terms.

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[5] The grain line with the highest maintenance cost per gross tonne km per year in NSW.
IPART, 2012, review of access pricing on the NSW grain line network Final Report
[6] Transport for NSW 2024, Economic Parameter Values, version 2024.4
[7] Freight Australia, Freight Train Interactive Maps, 2024
[8] Australian Transport Assessment and Planning, Appendix D Detailed VOC Coefficients (uninterrupted flow). Table 50, assuming a travel speed of 80km, a 45km trip distance (one way), a gross vehicle mass of 80 tonnes, and a roughness index of 4.5 (fair).
[9] CSIRO 2024, Supply Chain Transport and Logistics Dashboard, Powered by TraNSIT.
Assuming a cost per tonne of CO2-e of $128, from NSW Treasury 2023, Technical note to NSW Government Guide to Cost Benefit Analysis – Carbon value in cost-benefit analysis, TPG-23-08.
[10] Assuming a 5% discount rate over 30 years.
[11] Transport for NSW 2024, Economic Parameter Values, version 2024.4
[12] Transport for NSW 2024, Economic Parameter Values, version 2024.4
[13] Assumed to equal 1 hour of own travel time plus

Increased road crashes, injuries and fatalities

Even though heavy trucks represent only 4% of vehicles on rural roads[14], they account for 16% of road crash fatalities[15]. Using the same volume and distance assumptions as outlined in Box 1 to calculate the vehicle kilometres associated with moving 2MMT/year of grain, combined with parameter values for crash rates on rural roads[16] the analysis indicates that a shift to trucks would result in 0.08 crashes resulting in at least one fatality, and 0.26 crashes resulting in at least one injury each year. The economic value of these incidents is calculated to total $0.77m/year, $12.50m in present value terms[17].

The while the monetary cost of crashes captures the 'social value' of avoided fatalities and injuries, they ignore the 'human cost' and emotional trauma of these tragedies and therefore should be considered a conservative lower-bound figure only.

Decreased network resilience to natural disasters

The Freight Policy Reform Interim Directions Report also identifies resilience as a key theme for further improvement, noting that *"the poor resilience of rail corridors, with limited alternatives and significant operational impacts from disruptions, has contributed to a decline in rail mode share."* For example, when grain rail lines are closed, trucks will be forced to put more pressure on unsealed roads in order to transport grain to more distant silos or receival sites. Unsealed roads are highly vulnerable to wet weather and closure for long periods of time, putting entire crops at risk of being stranded upcountry if alternative and efficient routes are not available.

It is incongruent for the Directions Report to simultaneously seek to increase resilience in the grain transport network AND further restrict the options available to farmers to transport grain by recommending that grain lines close. It should be noted that redundancy is a key aspect of resilience[18], and that the availability of rail lines that are not fully utilised each year should be identified as a key strength of the system, not a weakness and financial burden.

Impact on labour shortages for truck drivers

Research undertaken by the National Road Transport Association has found that there is an immediate shortage of 26,000 truck drivers, and a shortfall of 180,000 (14.4%) to bring the sector down to the national job vacancy rate of 5-6%[19]. Additionally, since agricultural freight is highly variable, pushing grain transport onto trucks will not result in an appreciable increase in the supply of truck and drivers. While the Directions Report notes the expansion of on-farm storage, this will only serve to shift the demand for drivers to periods where grain prices are favourable, as farmers typically hold grain in anticipation of targeting their supply to narrow windows of time where prices are higher.

While the Interim Direction Report does recognise the issues associated with workforce shortages throughout the logistics sector, NSWFA considers that the proposed actions and directions are not likely to increase supply of labour in the medium term, noting that 36% of all occupations currently face a national labour supply shortage[20]. A greater reliance on trucks as a mode of grain transport will only serve to exacerbate existing truck driver shortages to the detriment of the entire logistical network, and further cripple the sector's flagging productivity[21].

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[14] Transport for NSW 2024, Economic Parameter Values, version 2024.4
[15] BITRE, 2016, Heavy truck safety: crash analysis and trends, Information sheet
[16] Transport for NSW 2024, Economic Parameter Values, version 2024.4
[17] Transport for NSW 2024, Economic Parameter Values, version 2024.4
[18] Zhou, Y., Wang, J., Yang, H. 2019, Resilience of Transportation Systems: Concepts and Comprehensive Review, IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, Vol 20(12)
[19] National Road Transport Association, 2024, NatRoad calls on National Cabinet to address crisis in supply chain
[20] Jobs and Skills Australia 2023, 2023 Skills Priority List Key Findings Report
[21] Freight Australia, 2023, National Freight and Supply Chain Strategy

APPENDIX A: Inventory of non-operational rail lines

Table A1 provides an inventory of the non-operational rail lines in NSW, using the spatial data contained in the NSW Transport Theme[22]. The NSW Transport Theme, Railway Layer provides a breakdown of operational and non-operational lines – which is the same data that TfNSW and TAHE use to classify the length of operational and non-operational lines in their documentation[23]. A visual assessment was carried out using Google Street View to determine the character of the lines.

Table A1: Inventory of non-operational rail lines in NSW and an assessment of the level infrastructure remaining.

Railway Name	Operational (m)	Non-operational (m)	Non-operational rail character
BARMEDMAN RANKIN SPRINGS		138,955	Non-existent
BUNGENDORE CAPTAINS FLAT		41,784	Defunct
BURREN JUNCTION POKATAROO	60,001	17,373	Non-existent
CAMURRA BOGGABILLA	10,991	126,157	Non-existent
CASINO MURWILLUMBAH		151,719	Non-existent
COOTAMUNDRA TUMUT		125,482	Non-existent
COWRA EUGOWRA	50	96,454	Non-existent
CULCAIRN COROWA		94,037	Defunct
GALONG BOOROWA	1,003	33,828	Non-existent
GILMORE BATLOW		25,048	Non-existent
GLENREAGH DORRIGO		34,022	Non-existent
GLENREAGH MOUNTAIN TOURIST		45,689	Non-existent
GOULBURN BOMBALA	194,473	181,401	Defunct
GOULBURN CROOKWELL		61,860	Non-existent
GULGONG MARY VALE		1,055	Non-existent
HENTY RAND		64,775	Defunct
ILLAWARRA	186,729	310	Non-existent
JUNEE HAY	179,291	149,693	Defunct
MAIN NORTHERN	785,910	246,033	Defunct
MAIN WESTERN	720,255	232,520	Non-existent
MOLONG DUBBO	7,718	145,470	Defunct
MOREE INVERELL		176,841	Defunct/Non-existent
MUSWELLBROOK MERRIWA	52,576	44,591	Non-existent
NARRABRI WEST WALGETT	196,096	4,296	Non-existent
NARRANDERA TOCUMWAL		221,909	Defunct
PICTON MITTAGONG LOOP LINE	42,756	5,120	Defunct
PRIVATE	5,810	39,399	Maintained
RICHMOND VALE		6,733	Defunct
TARANA OBERON		27,414	Defunct/Non-existent
URANQUINTY KYWONG		65,532	Non-existent
WAGGA WAGGA TUMBARUMBA		121,943	Non-existent
WALLERAWANG GWABEGAR	139,856	372,771	Maintained (Lithgow to Gulgong) Defunct (Binnaway to Gwabegar)
WERRIS CREEK MUNGINDI	411,464	30,539	Non-existent
WEST TAMWORTH BARRABA		115,483	Non-existent
WEST WYALONG BURCHER		64,949	Non-existent
Total	**2,994,980**	**3,311,186**	

Non-existent = rail infrastructure totally decayed. Defunct = rail infrastructure mostly decayed. Maintained = rail infrastructure in place, used occasionally.

[22] NSW Spatial Services, NSW Transport Theme, 2024 https://portal.spatial.nsw.gov.au/portal/home/item.html?id=010975d9b9594f659df467266528c9be

[23] For example: TfNSW, Heavy Rail, https://www.transport.nsw.gov.au/operations/roads-and-waterways/business-and-industry/partners-and-suppliers/private-development-0-0